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Abstract Modern cloud computing platforms based
on virtual machine monitors carry a variety of complex
business that present many network security vulnera-
bilities. At present, the traditional architecture employs
a number of security devices at front-end of cloud com-
puting to protect its network security. Under the new
environment, however, this approach can not meet the
needs of cloud security. New cloud security vendors and
academia also made great efforts to solve network secu-
rity of cloud computing, unfortunately, they also can-
not provide a perfect and effective method to solve this
problem. We introduce a novel network security archi-
tecture for cloud computing (NetSecCC) that addresses
this problem. NetSecCC not only provides an effective
solution for network security issues of cloud computing,
but also greatly improves in scalability, fault-tolerant,
resource utilization, etc. We have implemented a proof-
of-concept prototype about NetSecCC and proved by
experiments that NetSecCC is an effective architecture
with minimal performance overhead that can be applied
to the extensive practical promotion in cloud comput-
ing.
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1 Introduction
computing is a new computing paradigm that is built
on distributed and parallel computing, virtualization,
network storage technologies, load balance, utility com-
puting, and service-oriented architecture. In the last
several years, cloud computing has emerged as one of
the most influential paradigms in the IT industry, and
has attracted extensive attention from both academia
and industry. The benefits of cloud computing include
reduced costs and capital expenditures, increased op-
erational efficiencies, scalability, flexibility, immediate
time to market, and so on.
Although the great benefits brought by cloud com-
puting paradigm are exciting for IT companies, aca-
demic researchers, and potential cloud users, cloud se-
curity becomes serious obstacles which, without being
appropriately addressed, will prevent cloud computing’s
extensive applications and usage in the future. Espe-
cially, cloud network security has become one of the
prominent security concerns [3] [27] [34] [4] [18] [8] [31]
[32] [17], even the vast majority of data destruction or
tampering or forgery in cloud computing mainly come
from malicious network attacks [10]. It is further ev-
idence from National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
[11] that until February 2013, 84 network vulnerabil-
ities have been discovered in cloud computing. All the
above evidence has strongly confirmed that malicious
attacks from network is a serious security threat to a
variety of network-based services (e.g., Website, bank,
date center) in cloud computing.
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There are multiple ways to solve network security
issues of cloud computing, we divided them into three
types: the solution from the traditional architecture,
the solution from cloud provider and recent efforts from
academia research. The traditional architecture as shown
in Fig 1 places network security devices (middleboxs [6])
at front-end of cloud computing to protect their net-
work security, but the architecture is applied to cloud
security to bring some problems. Is lack of network
security protection between VMs: Since a com-
promised VM easily attacks other VMs in the same
hardware platform by virtual network [1] [29], cloud
security is required to prevent not only malicious at-
tacks from external traffic but also internal attacks from
the malicious VM, thereby ensuring network security
of cloud computing. However, the traditional architec-
ture is lack of internal network protection mechanism
between VMs. Difficult scalability : The traditional
architecture appears such a scenario: traffic bursts and
exceeds the maximum capacity of the existing deployed
middleboxs at some point, while traffic in other times is
in the normal work. If we add the corresponding middle-
boxs to avoid traffic loss by peak load, thus resulting
in not only less efficient resource utilization, but also
higher costs and more post-maintenance costs. Diffi-
cult Fault-tolerance: Using hot standby (HS) in the
traditional architecture can offer fault tolerance for the
failed middelboxs. However, only a enterprise network
requires 640 middleboxs to protect its security [24] [25],
not to mention, cloud computing hosting more complex
multi-services needs much more middleboxs than a en-
terprise network. If we also use the same hot standby to
offer fault tolerance in cloud computing for such a large-
scale middleboxs, this results in unsustainable costs.
Cloud computing
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Fig. 1: The traditional architecture
In order to address the shortcomings of the tradi-
tional architecture and provide suitable for network se-
curity service of cloud computing, cloud security ven-
dors have taken some measures. McAfee SaaS [20] merely
provides for a single type of security protection in cloud
computing (Web and Email), but is lack of complex
multi-service protection in cloud. Amazon Web Ser-
vices (AWS) [12] only provide basic network security
with a port-based firewall, they need to turn to part-
ners like security vendors to provide robust network se-
curity with the granularity, control and reporting that
you need. VMware vShield (app, endpoint, edge, zones)
[16] provides services in cloud with partial network se-
curity protection, but is short of comprehensive and
integrated capacity (e.g., encryption transmission, anti-
virus). Security as a Service (SecaaS) [15] provides ser-
vices in cloud with comprehensive security protection,
including web, email and intrusion SecaaS, but does
not involve their scalability, system fault-tolerance and
cooperation between them.
In academia, Wu et al. [30] aim to control the inter-
communication among virtual machines with higher se-
curity by the embedded firewall in virtualized envi-
ronment, but this method does not prevent malicious
attacks from external traffic, and also not involves in
flexible scalability and fault tolerance for the firewall.
Salah et al. [23] have proposed cloud-based security
overlay network which can provide a comprehensive
protection solution for servers and end-users, but is also
lack of an effective scalability and fault-tolerance mech-
anism. Split/Merge [22] can be dynamically scaled out
(or in) virtual middleboxs in cloud computing by SDN
[7], which only focuses on load-balanced elasticity and
system utilization without paying attention to prevent-
ing external and internal malicious traffic from attack-
ing on cloud services. [25] [21] well combine with mid-
dleboxs and SDN to protect enterprise network security,
and provides a flexible scalability and fault-tolerance
mechanism, but it’s a pity that they are not suitable
for cloud security.
Since it is not suitable or defective for the above
efforts to protect network security of cloud computing,
we propose NetSecCC architecture that takes a novel
approach of eliminating these disadvantages. It not only
prevents external and internal malicious attacks and of-
fer on-demand network security service for cloud users,
but also is able to provide flexible scalability and fault
tolerance for virtual middleboxs’ load and failure, re-
spectively. Experiments have further fully proved that
NetSecCC has efficient results in terms of scalability
and fault tolerance, and also provides security services
for cloud computing without sacrificing great perfor-
mance as consideration. In summary, our main contri-
butions are as follows:
• Innovative architecture We propose a novel flex-
ible effective security architecture which uses a sys-
tematic approach to properly provide security pro-
tection for cloud computing, and to guide cloud com-
puting road to industrialization.
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• Preventing external and internal malicious
attacks NetSecCC not only protects against mali-
cious attacks from external traffic, but also prevents
attacks from internal traffic to ensure network secu-
rity of cloud users’ services in cloud computing.
• Scalability Our architecture presents balanced scal-
ability alongside VM scale-in and scale-out for vir-
tual middleboxs according to their load.
• Fault tolerance When VMs hosting virtual mid-
dleboxs fail, our approach provides many-to-one fault-
tolerant mechanism to overcome disadvantages of
the traditional HS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides an overview of the design of NetSecCC. Section
3 details the implementation of the entire system. In
section 4, we show the results of the experiments we
conducted for evaluating the impact and performance
of our system. Finally, Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Design
Before we describe the NetSecCC design, we assume
that hardware platform, hypervisor and VMs-OS on
cloud computing are trusted, we only focus on network
security of services placed on cloud computing. Fig. 2
shows NetSecCC architecture, security manage domain
(SMD) as a controller guides external and internal traf-
fic through security Meta-Group (SMG) to be filtered
and inspected by vSwitch, SMG as a performer per-
forms security inspection and filtering for incoming and
outgoing traffic of cloud users’ services, service domains
host cloud users’ services. Next, we present the compo-
nents of NetSecCC and their operations.
2.1 Principle
As Fig 2 shows, NetSecCC mainly consists of four parts:
a system domain (dom0), security management domains,
security meta-group and service domains. We first begin
by the components of NetSecCC and their operations
before elaborating on NetSecCC principle.
• Dom0 We weaken dom0 privileges, it does not have
permission to create/start and stop/destroy any do-
main in SMG. At the same time, dom0 still keeps
such permissions to do with all domains in service
domains and SMD, and manages resources, includ-
ing scheduling time-slices, I/O quotas, etc.
• SMD is composed of management domain (MD) and
event and log management domain (ELMD). MD
is responsible for three main functions: first, cre-
ate/destroy any domain in SMG; Second, collect
state information (e.g., CPU utilization, sessions)
from every group in SMG and receive state infor-
mation (e.g., load, failure) from vSwich; Third, gen-
erate and update routing in virtual switch (vSwtich)
according to security inspection chains (SIC) §(2.2),
virtual middleboxs’ load and failure. ELMD stores
and manages events and logs from SMG, and pro-
vides the unified query for security managers.
• SMG is comprised of various security meta-groups
(e.g., WAF group, IDS group, AV group, etc). Ev-
ery group includes one or multiple virtual middle-
boxs (To simplify, we also call virtual middleboxs
security domains) such as IDS, AV. Note that each
virtual middlebox is installed in a standalone VM.
Security domains are responsible for traffic security
inspection and filtering, and provide fault-tolerant
for the failed security domains by the improved Hot
Standby (HS).
• Service Domains host various types of Internet-
based cloud users’s services (e.g., FTP server, Web
server).
• vSwtich is responsible for receiving routing from
MD, and forwarding external and internal traffic
through security domains to be filtered and inspected.
Next, in order to clearly describe NetSecCC work
principle, we divides it into three steps:
• Generate routing MD as a SDN controller gen-
erates and issues to routing to vSwitch according
to SIC mapped by network security requirements
of cloud users’ services (To simplify, we call it SIC
of cloud users’ services), security domains topology,
middleboxs’ load and failure from SMG. Specifically,
MD generates and updates routing in vSwtich in the
following two stages: The initial phase, when cloud
users employ their services in service domains before
not running, MD generates routing in accordance
with SIC of cloud users’ service, security domains
topology and current middleboxs’ load; The run-
ning phase, when middelboxs appears overload and
low-load or failure, MD updates routing in vSwtich
to rebalance middleboxs’s load for overload and low-
load, and provide fault tolerance for failure.
• Forward traffic VSwitch as a openflow switcher
forwards external and internal traffic through SMG
to be inspected and filtered according to routing in
vSwitch. Incompetence external traffic from Inter-
net or internal traffic from VMs must route through
SMG before arriving at services in service domains,
thereby ensuring services security. To make this pro-
cess concrete, we use Web server in service domains
as an example as shown in Fig 2 to elaborate on the
processing. SIC (FW-WAF) of Web server can guar-
antee that internal and external traffic arriving at
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Fig. 2: NetSecCC architecture
Web server is secure and trusted. Web traffic is first
forwarded to FW by vSwtich to be filtered, then
forwarded to WAF to be inspected, finally, arrives
at Web server. Here vSwitch contains forwarding
routing mapped by Web security chains FW-WAF,
light blue areas in flow table express routing from
external traffic through chains FW-WAF, red areas
indicate routing from internal traffic through FW-
WAF.
• Filtering and inspection SMG is responsible for
filtering and inspecting incoming traffic before it is
forwarded to service domains. According to the cor-
responding SIC, traffic is required to go through one
or more security groups to ensure that traffic arriv-
ing at service domains is secure and trusted. That is,
first group on SIC path receives and performs traffic
security inspection, then forwards it to vSwtich. If
SIC has next group, traffic is forwarded to it to be
filtered and inspected, in turn until the last group.
We can observe from NetSecCC work principle that
the corresponding SIC of cloud users’ services and scala-
bility and fault-tolerance of every group in SMG are the
focus of NetSecCC design. SIC of cloud users’ services
focuses on on-demand security service (§2.2), while ev-
ery group shows flexible scalability and efficient fault
tolerance (§2.3) to increase load balancing and high
availability, and improve resource utilization.
2.2 SIC
SIC is a sequence of logical policy chains through one or
more security groups (e.g., FW-WAF, FW-IDS), traf-
fic accessing to service domains must route through
the corresponding SIC to ensure the security of service
domains. NetSecCC is able to offer suitable for their
FTP Server
NAS
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UTM
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Service DomainsSecurity Meta-Group
All traffic
Email Server
Bank Business
Storage Server 
WAF
Group
AS
Group
SSL/VPN
Group
Web Server
AV
Group
IDS
Group
FW
Group
Hyperv
isor
Hypervisor
Fig. 3: Security Inspection Chains
SICs according to different network security require-
ments from different services, namely, on-demand secu-
rity service as shown in Fig 3. Note that many middle-
boxes are stateful and need to process both directions of
a session for correctness. To make this discussion con-
crete, we use two examples to further illustrate SIC.
Web server in service domains needs to solve these
attacks from network-layer and application-layer. At-
tacks from network-layer include DDOS attack, syn at-
tack, etc. Attacks from application-layer includes cross-
site attacks, SQL injection, vulnerability overflow and
so on. NetSecCC provides Web server security with SIC
(FW-WAF) as shown in Fig 3 using yellow lines, Web
traffic must flow through FW and WAF, where FW
group assures its network-lay security, WAF group of-
fers its application-layer security, thereby ensuring that
traffic reaching web service is secure.
Email server security requirements are able to
prevent from DDOS attack, syn attack, malicious e-
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mail, spam and virus e-mail, etc. Even some important
emails need to be encrypted transmission. NetSecCC
provides email server with SICs (FW-AS-SSL/VPN)
indicated in Fig 3 with red lines to guarantee its secu-
rity. Where FW group secures network-layer security of
email server, AS group filter malicious and spam e-mail
to guarantee application-layer security, and SSL/VPN
group provides some important emails with secure trans-
mission.
2.3 Group Management
MD as a SDN controller is responsible for controlling
traffic accessing to services in service domains to fol-
low their corresponding SICs. While each group on SIC
path is a real performer on security inspection and fil-
tering, preventing malicious and virus attacks to ensure
that external and internal traffic arriving at services
traffic are secure and trusted. In this process, when se-
curity domains (nodes) in some group on SIC path ap-
pear overload and low-load and failure, NetSecCC needs
to rebalance load in groups for overload and low-load
to strengthen network traffic processing capability, in-
cluding increasing throughput and resource utilization,
and to provide fault tolerance using hot standby for
failure to improve seamless inspection and filtering, in-
cluding reducing system recover time. Note that the
HS is not a traditional one-to-one relationship [2] [28]
[33] between actives node and standby nodes, but is
a improved many-to-one relationship, namely, state in-
formation of all active nodes are synchronized to one
standby to improve resource utilization.
MD
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Fig. 4: The working mechanism of every group in SMG.
When one group faces traffic overload, low-load and
node failure, Fig 4 presents NetSecCC how to deal with
them. In the face of overload and low load, MD collects
and receives load and traffic information (e.g., session,
cpu utilization) from active nodes in real time (1); Ac-
cording to the received information, MD makes such a
determination that if the load of the active nodes is not
balanced, MD renews routing in vSwitch to adjust the
load between the active nodes (4). If all active nodes
overload, MD creates a active node (2), and dynami-
cally generates new routing to renew forwarding rules
in vSwitch (4) to balance the load in active nodes. If
active nodes appear low load, MD may destroy a active
node (2), and renew forwarding rules in vSwitch (4)
to improve resource utilization. To make load balanc-
ing contrate, we present from Fig 4 how to MD adjusts
flow table to rebalance load. Initially, WebID1 and We-
bID2 traffic is forwarded to node1 and node2, respec-
tively, to be inspected and filtered. If WebID3 traffic
goes through node1 and node2, they overload. So MD
changes this situation to create node3, and adds for-
warding rules to route WebID3 traffic to node3. When
WebID3 traffic ends, MD deletes rules forwarding traf-
fic to node3, and destroys node3.
Since most middleboxs are stateful, a middelbox
fails to result in loss of the established sessions in its
memory. If a client accesses to the remote server again,
the rebooted middlebox needs to re-establish the new
session between the client and the server, resulting in a
large time delay. Although the traditional HS is able to
solve this problem by one-to-one switchover between ac-
tive nodes and standby nodes, too many standby nodes
seriously reduce resource utilization. Because middle-
boxs failure is small probability event, NetSecCC uses
many-to-one mapping relationship between all active
nodes and one standby node, that is, state informa-
tion in all active nodes are synchronized to to the same
standby node. When any active node fails, between the
failed active node and the standby node achieve auto-
matic switch-over, the standby node immediately takes
on the role of the active node. At the same time, MD
renew forwarding rules to route traffic to the switched
standby node. The improved HS not only overcomes
a long time delay to reboot the failed middlebox, but
also improves system resource utilization. A specific ex-
ample as shown in Fig 4 is that node1 suddenly fails,
node4 immediately takes responsibilities of node1 by
switch-over, and forwarding rules in vSwitch is renewed
to route WebID1 to node4. This process is done auto-
matically without human involvement. A more detailed
process is shown in Section 3.2.
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3 Implement
The above design elaborates the principle of NetSecCC.
In this section, we represent the implement of Net-
SecCC in detail. For the implementation of NetSecCC,
we focus on the implementation of MD and security
group. MD provides cloud users’s services placed on
cloud computing with their corresponding SIC to en-
sure their network security, and dynamically adjusts
load balancing in security groups according to the load
information. While security groups not only perform se-
curity inspection and filtering, but also improve quality
of security service, including resource utilization, fault
tolerance, high availability. We first demonstrate MD
implement.
3.1 MD Implement
MD as a SDN controller plays two important role in
NetSecCC implementation. First, it controls traffic for-
warding through their corresponding SIC of cloud users’
services in service domains to ensure these services secu-
rity. Second, it rebalances load due to traffic overloads
or low load or node failure in each group. MD imple-
ments its two functions by forwarding rules in vSwitch,
the implement process is shown in Fig 5. Resource man-
ager sorts and analyzes these data from the inputs: state
information from groups in SMG (e.g., CPU, session,
etc), state information from vSwitch, groups topology
and SIC (on-demand security service), and outputs the
parameters considered as the inputs of RouteGen. Route-
Gen converts these parameters to forwarding rules us-
ing forwarding traffic through groups in SMG to be in-
spected and filtered. Until deployment of new services
or security needs change in service domains, traffic over-
load or low load or node failure in groups, MD generates
or renews rules in vSwitch.
SIC
MD
Resource manager
RouteGen
Groups topology FW WAF(e.g., Web traffic)
State information from groups State from vSwitch
vSwitch
Fig. 5: MD implement
3.2 Security Group
Above we have introduced MD that is consider as a con-
ductor for network security inspection and filtering of
cloud computing, security groups are seen as the actual
operator to put into effect specific security inspection.
In this subsection, we elaborate on the implementation
of security group in detail by means of focusing on load
balancing and fault tolerance of each group in SMG as
shown in Fig 6. We first dwell on their cooperation be-
tween MD, active nodes and vSwitch to implement load
balancing between active nodes, Fig 6(a) present their
work sequence and communication.
1. MD
ReqMessagequery (IDNode)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1a
active Nodes: IDNode de-
notes the current active node identifier, query mes-
sage queries all active nodes’ state information.
2. Active nodes
ResMessagequery (IDNode,CPU,memory)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1b
MD:
All current active nodes respond to their own state
information including CPU utilization, memory us-
age, sessions, etc.
3. vSwitch
ReqMessagereport (vSwitch)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2a
MD: vSwitch peri-
odically reports the number of packets and flow size
through active nodes to MD.
4. MD
ResMessagereport (vSwitch)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2b
vSwitch: MD responds
report message to vSwitch.
5. LB algorithm: Alg (the number of packets, flow size,
CPU, memory, session, etc) (3a). Note: load bal-
ancing algorithm is used current popular algorithm
such as round robin, dynamic server act, dynamic
ratio-APM, etc. The article concentrates on security
architecture of cloud computing, load balancing al-
gorithm is not too much expressed.
6. MD
ReqMessagerelease (vSwitch)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4a
vSwitch: MD issues for-
warding rules to vSwitch according to LB algorithm.
7. vSwitch
ResMessagerelease
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4b
MD: vSwitch responds to
MD for release message.
Next, we elaborate on work sequence and communi-
cation between active nodes and standby node to pre-
pare for fault-tolerant on account of any active node
failure as show in Fig 6(b).
1. Active or standby node
ReqMessageheartbeat (IDNode)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1a
standby
or active node: They probe each other to determine
whether the other is alive.
2. Standby or active node
ResMessageheartbeat (IDNode)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1b
active
or standby node: They respond to each other probes.
3. Active node
ReqMessageinform (IDNode,state,session)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2a
standby
node: The renewed information (such as state, ses-
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Fig. 6: Load balancing and fault-tolerance processing in one group.
sion) is backed up from active nodes to standby node
in real time.
4. Standby node
ReqMessageinform (IDNode)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2b
active node:
Standby node responds to active nodes for the re-
newed message.
Finally, we explain Hot Standby switch-over process
in accordance with an active node failure and present
sequence and communication between MD and standby
node to implement fault-tolerant as show in Fig 6(b),
namely, any active node fails, the standby node imme-
diately takes on its responsibilities.
1. Standby node
ReqMessagereplace (IDactive,IDstandby)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3a
MD:
Standby node has probed that the active node has
occurred an exception, then sends a replacement
message to MD to switch over between the active
node and the standby node.
2. MD
ResMessagereplace
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3b
Standby node: MD responds to
the standby node for switch-over.
3. MD
ReqMessagerelease (vSwitch)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4a
vSwitch: MD renews for-
warding rules to vSwitch after switch-over. The standby
node becomes one active node to be responsible for
inspecting and filtering the received traffic.
4. vSwitch
ResMessagerelease
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4b
MD: vSwitch responds to
MD for the renewed message.
To summarize, MD guilds security groups to put
into effect security inspection for traffic accessing to
service domains, ensuring that traffic arriving at service
domains is secure and trusted, while security groups are
the specific implementer of security inspection. They
complement each other to achieve security protection
of cloud computing.
4 Evaluation
In this section, We evaluate NetSecCC with the follow-
ing goals:
• evaluate NetSecCCs ability to provide dynamic scal-
ability to complex real world middleboxes, and mea-
sure the gain in resource utilization when scaling in
a deployment using NetSecCC (§4.1).
• evaluate the response time, especially fault-tolerant
time and creation VM time when one or more of the
active nodes fail (§4.2).
• evaluate system overhead with NetSecCC compared
to without security protection in cloud computing
(§4.3).
Table 1: The list of open source software about security
softwares
Product Name Open Source Software
FW IPFire [5]
WAF ModSecurity [9]
SSL/VPN OpenSSL [14]
AS PacketFence [26]
Experimental environmentCloud platform was con-
ducted on a Dell Server with 8 core, 3.42 GHz Intel
CPU, 16GB memory. The XEN hypervisor version is
3.4.2, the dom0 system is fedora 16 with kernel version
2.6.31. We used a 64bit fedora Linux with kernel ver-
sion 2.6.27 as our guest OS, vSwitch bandwidth is 1
Gigabit Ethernet; NetSecCC uses open source security
as softwares shown in TABLE I. Note that in our exper-
iments, we use open source software about the network
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security rather than middleboxs from big security ven-
dors, thus easily migrating these security software to
cloud computing.
4.1 Scalability
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(a) Scaling out and in WAF due to traffic overload and low load.
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Fig. 7: Scaling out and in security groups to test Net-
SecCC’s scalability due to traffic overload and low load.
Figure Fig 7(a) shows NetSecCC’s ability to dynam-
ically scale WAF out and in during a load burst. Our
experiments environment is that Web server [19] is in-
stalled in a separate VM in service domains, 30 clients
in the form of a continuous sequence of POST requests
access to Web server, the requests contain SQL injec-
tion and cross-site scripting attacks, and each client
generates 80 requests/second. We inject a load burst
50 seconds into the experiment by introducing an ad-
ditional 30 clients, the load burst lasts 40 seconds. We
compare three scenarios: a single WAF instance that
handles the entire load burst, a pair of WAF that share
load (flows are assigned to each WAF in a round-robin
fashion) and NetSecCC. NetSecCC scenario begins with
a single WAF, when it overloads, NetSecCC creates a
new WAF to split Web traffic.
As shown in Figure 7(a), until the load burst at t
= 50s, all three scenarios have a 100% detection rate.
During the load burst, the performance of the single
WAF reduces drastically because packets are dropped
and attacks are missed. The two WAF do not expe-
rience any degradation as it has enough capacity and
the load is well balanced between the two WAF. While
NetSecCC creates a new WAF to split Web traffic ac-
cording to the load burst at t=50s, this leads to this
problem: packets are dropped and attacks are missed.
However, the detection rate quickly rises because the
two WAF have enough capacity for the load burst. Af-
ter the load burst (t = 90s), NetSecCC detects a drop
in load according to destroying one WAF. NetSecCC
therefore enables WAF to handle the load burst with-
out wasting resources by running two WAF throughout
the entire experiment.
Figure 7(b) shows system utilization between Net-
SecCC and a pair of FW that share load (flows are as-
signed to each FWs in a round-robin fashion). Our ex-
periments environment is that UDP server is installed
on a separate VM in service domains, 100 UDP clients
continuously send UDP packets to UDP server, each
client evenly generates from 8M requests/second to 1M
requests/second within 100 seconds in the descending
way, NetSecCC initially has two FW to share UDP traf-
fic. NetSecCC system utilization from 80% to 50% is the
same as this pair of FW in 50 seconds before, however,
NetSecCC utilization burst reaches 80% at t=50s, the
main reasons that NetSecCC is configured with a scale-
in policy that triggers once one FW load falls below
50, one FW is destroyed, another FW is responsible for
consolidating resources during low load and improves
overall system utilization. After 50 seconds, NetSecCC’s
system utilization decreases from 80% to 20% with less
traffic, while this pair of FW reduce to 10%.
4.2 Fault Tolerance
We consider one dynamic scenario in Fig 4. When one
of the active nodes fails, we need to rebalance the load
and we are interested in the time to recover the normal
running network. For failure, Figure 8 shows a break-
down of the time it takes to detect time (collect and
receive state information), generate new rules, and in-
stall them. Here balancing the load only takes 1 second
by MD. However, we have to consider a special case,
if the other active nodes have been in overload, rebal-
ancing the load between the active nodes may further
worsen the entire system. It is necessary to create a
new active node to split traffic, which leads to a longer
response time (3 seconds) as indicated CreateNode in
Fig 8, this is unacceptable to cloud users. Switch-over of
HS spends little time (1.2 seconds), which is far lower
than CreateNode. So when one or more of the active
nodes fail, MD divided into two cases: if the other ac-
tive nodes overload, then MD launches HS, otherwise,
activates rebalancing the load.
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Fig. 8: Response time in the case of a middlebox failure
4.3 Performance Overhead
To evaluate NetSecCC’s system performance overhead,
we use throughput and latency that are important in-
dicator of system performance as an evaluation crite-
ria. Although this way without employing NetSecCC is
higher efficiency than one with NetSecCC, if we do not
make the protective measures to protect cloud comput-
ing security, this may lead to incalculable losses. So we
have to protect network security of cloud computing to
defend various attacks from the network. Even if we se-
lect NetSecCC to protect cloud computing security, we
also have to consider whether its performance overhead
can be accepted. We use IXIA [13] as a performance
testing tool to evaluate NetSecCC’s performance over-
head, comparing both with and without network secu-
rity in cloud computing. Next, we use two experiments
to evaluate the performance impact with NetSecCC.
For Web page access as our first experiment, we use
IXIA both as a customer and as a server to test with
and without NetSecCC. The experimental results show
in Fig 9, it is easy to see that NetSecCC has little im-
pact on system performance for web page access, the
average cost of its latency is 9.3% (ranging from 6.4%
to 13.9%) compared to without NetSecCC, the average
cost of its throughput is 0.4% (ranging from 0 to 3.7%).
The main reason for these overhead is that because SIC
of web page access as shown Fig 3 is composed of FW
group and WAF group, Web traffic must go through
FW group and WAF group to be inspected and fil-
tered, then arrives at Web server, while Web traffic di-
rectly accesses Web server without NetSecCC to avoid
inspection with system overhead. So compared to with-
out NetSecCC, latency becomes longer with NetSecCC,
throughput is suffered from the impact of latency, but
overall system performance with NetSecCC is within
the acceptable.
For Email access as our second experiment, we also
use IXIA to test performance overhead with NetSecCC.
The experimental results show in Fig 10, we can observe
that even the encrypted emails with NetSecCC are only
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Fig. 9: Performance comparison results between Net-
SecCC and without NetSecCC by Web page access.
slightly affected. The impact of latency and through-
put with NetSecCC is mainly due to emails must route
through FW group, AS group and SSL/VPN group as
shown in Fig 3, where the encrypted processing through
SSL/VPN group consumes some time. Compared to
without NetSecCC, specific data on the performance
overhead with NetSecCC is shown below: the average
cost of latency is 11.1% (ranging from 9.2% to 13.7%),
the average cost of throughput is 5% (ranging from 0
to 11.1%), such the performance overhead are perfectly
acceptable relative to security services.
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(a) Throughput comparison of mail access.
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Fig. 10: Performance comparison results between Net-
SecCC and without NetSecCC by mail access.
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In summary, by the comparison both with and with-
out NetSecCC in cloud computing, NetSecCC is not
only able to provide adequate network security protec-
tion for cloud computing, but also does not sacrifices
the high price of system performance. The two exper-
iments have further indicated that NetSecCC scheme
can provide the efficient comprehensive network pro-
tection for cloud computing.
5 Conclusion
Cloud users’ services in cloud computing face network
attacks from external and internal traffic. Both the tra-
ditional architecture and cloud providers and academia
do not provide a novel flexible effective architecture to
solve this problem. In this paper, NetSecCC is not only
able to prevent from external and internal attacks to
ensure cloud computing security, and provides flexible
scalability and high effective fault-tolerant capability,
but also experiments further show that NetSecCC’s per-
formance overhead is within the acceptable.
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